We revisit the classic sequential-search model by Weitzman (1979) in which an agent is presented with a number of boxes containing uncertain prizes, from which he selects one prize after sequentially opening the boxes and learning the prize contained within. In our model, each box is owned by an independent and ex-ante identical designer, whose objective is to get the agent to select the prize of his box. Each designer persuades the agent to pick his prize by designing the prize distribution of his box, subject to the constraints that (i) the expected value of the distribution is a constant, and (ii) the size of prize realizations is bounded. By focusing on symmetric equilibria, we show that for a range of parameters, the game only has mixed-strategy equilibria. We fully characterize the symmetric equilibria, and show that they have a simple linear structure. Moreover, we …nd that a decrease in the agent's search cost mitigates competition, thus bene…tting the designers.
Introduction
Consider a market in which a number of …rms compete by choosing their respective product designs. A product's design a¤ects the distribution of each consumer's match value (Johnson and Myatt (2006) ). A product with a boarder design has less variance in match values; a typical Nanyang Technological University, email: phau@ntu.edu.sg. This is a preliminary draft. Comments are very welcome.
consumer would not have a strong preference or aversion towards it. On the other hand, a product with a more niche design has a higher variance in match values; an individual consumer either likes it a lot or extremely hates it. Consumers know the type of product designs (how board or how niche) adopted by each …rm (possibly from …rms'images and their previous o¤ers), but they do not know their match values with the products. To learn about the match values, consumers have to engage in sequential search: by paying a search cost, each consumer visits a …rm and learns about the attributes of its product. How does competition shape …rms'product designs? Would …rms adopt a common design or di¤erent designs? How does search friction a¤ect the intensity of competition?
To answer these questions, we adapt the classic sequential-search model of Weitzman (1979) by assigning a designer to each of the boxes that the agent can sample. Speci…cally, our setting consists an agent and a number of box designers. Each box designer can choose the distribution of the prizes contained in his box, subject to two feasibility constraints. First, the sizes of the prizes are bounded. Second, the expected value of the prize distribution is constant at some value .
The agent selects at most one prize from the boxes she opened, and the objective of each designer is to get the agent to select the prize from his own box. The agent knows the distributions chosen by the designers, but not their prize realizations. By paying a search cost, she can open a box and learn its prize realization. The agent can sequentially sample unopened boxes in any order, and stop once she has found a satisfactory prize. We assume that the agent has a relatively high outside option so that she does not open any box with a degenerate prize distribution at . Weitzman (1979) provides a full characterization to the optimal search strategy of the agent, given the prize distributions of the boxes. Each prize distribution de…nes a reservation value, and the agent samples boxes in descending order of the reservation values. She stops and claims the best prize discovered if it exceeds the reservation values of all unopened boxes and her outside option. If none of the discovered prizes and reservation values of unopened boxes exceed her outside option, she quits the search altogether without collecting any prize. In his model, the prize distributions of the boxes are exogenously given; we endogenize these distributions by considering the competition among the box owners/designers.
The basic tradeo¤ facing each box designer is as follows. A box designer's expected payo¤ depends on both the probability that his box is sampled (opened) by the agent, and the probability that the prize of his box is eventually selected by the agent. Increasing the former probability calls for a more risky distribution (i.e., a distribution with higher likelihoods of extreme prizes), which is akin to a niche product design in the opening example. Conversely, increasing the latter probability calls for a less risky distribution, which is akin to a board design in the opening example.
At …rst glance, choosing a prize distribution is not a straightforward problem. While o¤ering a prize above the reservation value (and the agent's outside option) ensures immediate acceptance by the agent upon its realization, o¤ering a prize below the reservation value may either lead to immediate acceptance, delayed acceptance (after the agent opens some other boxes and recalls this previous prize), or eventual rejection. Complicating the problem is the fact any positive measure assigned to any prize o¤er would a¤ect the box's reservation value, and hence the order and the probability of his box being sampled.
Our …rst result shows that the game has a simple pure-strategy equilibrium if competition is su¢ ciently intense. In that equilirbium, all designers choose the maximum possible reservation value by adopting the "riskiest" distribution. We then proceed to analyze the case where competition is less intense, and provide a complete characterization of all symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. The key to our characterization is a function that describes the probability that a designer will be sampled (at some point in the agent's search) for di¤erent choices of reservation values. We …nd that in every mixed-strategy equilibrium, this function must exhibit a linear structure. This linear structure in turn implies that an individual designer's payo¤ function of o¤ering di¤erent prizes is also linear. Consequently, any mixed strategy over prize distributions that supports a linear sampling probability function described above constitutes an equilibrium.
Moreover, our characterization result shows that the mixed-strategy equilibrium is unique up to the sampling probability function. This in turn implies that the designer's equilibrium payo¤ is unique.
The essential uniqueness result allows us to conclude that there is a cuto¤ level of competition intensity below which the equilibrium is necessarily in mixed-strategy (and above which the equilibrium is necessarily in pure-strategy). Our model therefore predicts that dispersion in product designs can arise naturally in a sequential-search setting with ex-ante homogenous …rms and consumers. This …nding is in interesting contrast to models of price competition with sequential search (such as Diamond (1971) and Wolinsky (1986) ) which …nd that the only equilibrium outcome is that all …rms charge the same price.
The essential uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium also allows us to obtain neat comparative statics results about the e¤ect of search friction on designers'equilibrium payo¤. We …nd that a decrease in the agent's search cost would mitigate competition and bene…t the designers.
Intuitively, when the agent has a lower search cost, she is likely to sample more boxes, so the need to o¤er a risky distribution to solicit the agent's patronage is lower. This result is in contrast to existing studies in sequential search (for example, Wolinsky (1986) ) which …nd that a lower search cost intensi…es price competition, thus hurting the …rms. In Section 4, we explain in greater details that this di¤erence is mainly due to the di¤erent nature of competition in the two models.
Competition involving information design has been studied in Board and Lu (2017) , and Au and Kawai (2017). In Board and Lu (2017) , …rms control the information that consumers can learn about how well a product …ts her needs, and consumers sequentially search for this information. Di¤erent from our model, all …rms in their model sell an homogeneous product. They show that whether …rms can observe the agent's search history has a signi…cant impact on the equilibrium outcome. Our model di¤ers from theirs as designers prize distributions are independent of each other; as such, our model can be interpreted as a market for di¤erentiated products.
Au and Kawai (2017) consider a similar model except that the agent learns all prize realizations simultaneously and costlessly. They show that a linear structure of the payo¤ function is necessary and su¢ cient for a pure-strategy equilibrium, and analyze the e¤ect of increasing the number of competitors. We …nd that in a sequential-search setting, designers necessarily play a mixed strategy when competition is mild. This feature, which can be interpreted as an equilibrium dispersion in product design, is absent in their model. Moreover, we study the e¤ect of search friction on designers'choice of distributions.
Model
A (female) agent has access to N 2 boxes containing prizes of unknown sizes, from which she can pick one eventually (if any). Each box i is controlled by an independent (male) designer, whose objective is to get the agent to select the prize from his own box. For concreteness, suppose he receives a payo¤ of 1 if his prize is being selected eventually, and a payo¤ of 0 otherwise.
He maximizes his chance of being selected by designing the distribution of the prizes of his box.
We impose only two constraints on the box designers'problem. First, the sizes of the prizes are bounded by some interval normalized to [0; 1]. Second, the distribution must have an expected value of 2 (0; 1). We say a distribution is feasible if it satis…es both constraints. The space of all feasible distributions is denoted by and a generic element chosen by designer i is denoted by
The agent engages in sequential search to learn about the boxes' prizes. Before the search begins, she observes the distributions chosen by all the designers fF i g i=1;2;:::;N , but not their prize realizations. Then she can proceed to open the boxes in any order. Opening each box requires a …xed search cost c. By opening a box, she learns about the realized prize of the box. She can then decide whether to pick that prize and stop the search, or continue her search by opening more boxes. Recall of any previously discovered prize is allowed. At any stage of her search, she can stop her search without taking any prize from the opened boxes; and in doing so, she collects her outside option of u 0 . We assume that her outside option exceeds c.
The assumption implies that it is never a best response for each designer to o¤er a degenerate prize distribution at , as doing so would make the agent discard his box without sampling it.
We look for the subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the designers adopt a common (possibly mixed) strategy. To this end, we need to …rst compute the agent's optimal search strategy given distributions fF i g i=1;2;:::;N . This problem has been solved by Weitzman (1979) . He shows that the agent's search problem has a remarkably simple solution, which is described below. First the agent calculates the reservation value U i of each box de…ned by the equation below:
Then he samples the boxes in descending order of reservation values, and stops whenever the highest discovered prize (so far) exceeds the reservation values of all the unopened boxes. To avoid uninteresting complications, we assume that whenever the agent is indi¤erent between several boxes, she randomizes equally between these boxes. Moreover, she goes for the outside option only if it is strictly optimal to do so.
As the agent's search strategy has been pinned down, our analysis will focus on the designers' choice of prize distribution. We say an equilibrium is symmetric if all designers adopt a common strategy. A useful preliminary observation is that the set of possible reservation values is bounded by the feasibility constraints on F i .
Lemma 1 The set of feasible reservation values of a box is in the interval
c; 1 c .
The lower bound in the lemma above is obtained by having all the mass of the distribution concentrated at ; whereas the upper bound is obtained by concentrating all the mass at 0 and 1 (in a way that the distribution has an expected value of ). Throughout the paper, we denote the highest feasible reservation value by U 1 c .
We conclude the model setup by remarking that the choice of prize distribution can be interpreted as choosing a posterior distribution over a binary state. The two feasibility constraints above correspond to the requirements that any posterior probability must be between zero and one, and that the expected value of posterior distribution must coincide with the prior. 1 
Characterization of Equilibria
We …rst show that a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists if and only if competition is su¢ ciently intense. Moreover, this equilibrium necessarily involves all designers adopting the reservation value U . We then analyze symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria, and show that they necessarily have a common linear structure to be described below.
Let's begin with symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 1
The only symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium involves each designer choosing reservation value U . Moreover, such an equilibrium exists if and only if
That is, all designers adopt reservation value U provided that , u 0 , c or N is su¢ ciently high.
The intuition is quite simple. First, if all other designers adopt a common prize distribution with a reservation value U < U , then one can do better than following them by choosing a very similar distribution but has a slightly higher reservation value. This increases his chance of being sampled by the agent, but has almost no impact on the probability of eventually being selected by the agent conditional on being sampled. Only if the all other designers o¤er U would such a deviation be infeasible. In this case, the only possible deviation is to o¤er a lower reservation value, and the consequence is that the designer's box would be sampled only after the agent has 1 The latter is referred to as the Bayes-plausibility condition in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
sampled all other boxes, and they all give the low prize 0. Such a deviation is unpro…table if being sampled (in the last position) is highly unlikely, i.e., or N is su¢ ciently high. It is also unpro…table if u 0 is su¢ ciently high, in which case the probability of realizing a prize above u 0 is too low, and so is the payo¤ conditional on being sampled last. Finally, a high search cost c discourages the deviation above because an increase in c lowers the reservation value of every prize distribution. Therefore, to achieve u 0 , the designer needs to o¤er a more risky prize distribution, which has a lower probability of realizing a prize above u 0 .
The rest of this section focuses on symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. A mixed strategy consists of a distribution over reservation value, denoted by G 2 4 c; U , and a prize distribution for each reservation value U , denoted by F U ( ). The following observations path the way for our equilibrium construction and characterization.
(ii) G does not have any atom, except possibly at U ; and and they all revealed a prize of no higher than U . Thus, the designer can strictly increase his payo¤ by lowering his reservation value, which would increase the chance that his box reveals a prize above U . This contradicts that U is the lower bound of G. It is immediate that U < u 0 is impossible, as designers adopting reservation value U would have a zero payo¤.
(ii) If G has an atom at some U < U , then the expected payo¤ associated with playing slightly above the atom would strictly exceed that of playing the atom. Let F U be the prize distribution associated with reservation value U , and (F U ) be the expected payo¤ conditional on being sampled. Let " > 0 and let F 0 be a mean-preserving spread of F U such that the expected payo¤ conditional on being sampled, (F 0 ) > (F U ) ". As F 0 has a higher reservation value than U , its probability of being sampled is strictly higher than F U . Therefore, by choosing " su¢ ciently small, F 0 is a pro…table deviation from F U .
(iii) Suppose R U U FŨ (U ) dG Ũ has an atom at some U 6 = 0. Then a positive measure of reservation valuesŨ > U under G has its prize distribution assigning an atom at U . It is immediate that assigning atom to some U 2 (0; u 0 ) is suboptimal, so suppose U 2 u 0 ; U . Conditional on choosing such reservation valueŨ > U , an individual designer's expected payo¤ can be strictly increased by slightly increasing the location of the atom in a way that preserves the mean and reservation value. Speci…cally, let " > 0 and the atom size at U be a. One can replace the atom at U with two atoms, one of size
at U + ", and the other of size
at 0. The atom at U + " brings a strictly higher payo¤ (in expectation conditional on its realization) by no less than 1 2 a N 1 , so the deviation is pro…table provided that " is su¢ ciently small. This contradicts the optimality of prize distribution chosen by designers with reservation value on the support of G.
Consider the problem facing an individual designer, assuming all other designers use a distribution G of reservation values. Suppose that the designer decides to choose a reservation value U 2 [u 0 ; U ). The probability that the designer's box would be sampled at some point of the agent's search, denoted by (U ), is given by
To understand equation (3), note that the designer's box would be sampled if and only if no other designers stop the agent's search prior to him being reached. This requires that for each other designer j, either (i) box j's reservation value is below U (which occurs with probability G (U )), or (ii) box j's has a higher reservation value but its prize is revealed to be below U (which occurs with probability
Denote by (p; U ) the designer's expected payo¤ of o¤ering a prize p, given the reservation value U of his box. This expected payo¤ function is related to the sampling probability function ( ) as follows:
Equation (4) is quite intuitive. If the designer o¤ers a prize p > U within a box with reservation value U , then he is selected with certainty whenever he is sampled, so (p; U ) = (U ). On the other hand, if the designer's prize p is below the box's reservation value U , he will be selected over the prize of another designer j if either one of the following two events happen: (i) p exceeds the reservation value U j of designer j (which occurs with probability G (p)), or (ii) p is below the reservation value U j but the realized prize p j of designer j falls below p (which occurs with
Using equation (4), the designer's optimization problem can be stated as follows:
Note that the problem above (and hence its solution) depends on the designer's choice of U .
Using the notations and observations above, G; fF U g U 2supp(G) is a symmetric equilibrium if for all U on the support of G (i) F U solves problem (5); and (ii)
gives the designer's equilibrium payo¤. The proposition below states that a speci…c linear structure on the sampling probability function ( ) is necessary and su¢ cient for a symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exists a pair of values
is a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium strategy if and only if (i) G has an atom at U ;
(ii) G has a support
(iii) for all U 2 supp (G), F U assigns a zero measure to (0; u 0 ); and (iv) the implied probability of being sampled by o¤ering reservation U (de…ned in equation 3)
According to Proposition 2, while there can be multiple symmetric equilibria, these equilibria are necessarily quite similar. First, they all share a common support, as well as a common atom at the top, in the reservation-value distribution. Second, the sampling probability (U ) are common to all equilibria.
In the proof of the proposition, we …rst show that the symmetric equilibrium payo¤ is unique.
This consequently pins down the unique atom of reservation-value distribution G. We use this fact to show that any equilibrium payo¤ function (p; U ) must be linear; for otherwise, the implied payo¤ would di¤er from the unique equilibrium payo¤. As the sampling probability function (U )
is related to (p; U ) according to (4) , it is necessary that (U ) has a particular linear structure in equilibrium. In the converse direction, we note that when facing a linear payo¤ function induced by the sampling probability (6), any prize distribution that does not assign any measure on (0; u 0 ) is optimal. Moreover, reservation values in the interval Û ; U is suboptimal, as lowering it toÛ would not a¤ect the probability of being sampled but would strictly increase the payo¤ conditional on being sampled.
A particularly simple class of strategies involves all designers adopting prize distribution with binary support of the form 0;
, where U is the box's reservation value. The corollary below
states that there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which all designers adopt these simple prize distributions.
Corollary 1 There exists a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which every designer adopts a prize distribution with a binary support of the form 0;
In the equilibrium described by the corollary above, the agent's search behavior is quite simple.
As each box contains a lottery that either a positive prize with some probability, she samples the boxes in descending order of the size of the prize. She stops once she receives some positive prize, and collects the outside option if all boxes reveal a zero prize.
Next, by inspecting the equilibrium conditions in Proposition 2, we can show that = 0 and U = u 0 if and only if inequality (1) holds. to learn about the price a …rm charges, the only equilibrium outcome is that all …rms charge the monopoly price. Reinganum (1979) shows that price dispersion can arise if …rms have di¤erent marginal costs. Stahl (1989) shows that equilibrium price dispersion can be obtained if a certain fraction of consumers is assumed to have a zero search cost. Considering …xed-sample search, Burdett and Judd (1983) show that equilibrium price dispersion can arise even if consumers and …rms are ex-ante identical. Our analysis shows that when …rms compete in product design, dispersion in product design can arise even if consumer's search is sequential, and all …rms and consumers are ex-ante identical.
We conclude this section by discussing a related …nding in our previous work. Au and Kawai (2017) consider a setting in which the prizes realizations of all boxed are simultaneously and costlessly revealed to the agent, and show that a certain linear structure of payo¤ function is necessary for an equilibrium. The key di¤erence between the current study and Au and Kawai (2017) is the nature of competition. Speci…cally, whereas designers in Au and Kawai (2017) compete only in getting selected by the agent, designers in the current setting compete in two fronts: getting sampled by the agent, and getting selected by the agent. This multi-dimensional competition complicates the analysis as a designer can beat another designer not by o¤ering a prize exceeding that of the other designer, but exceeding the reservation value of the other designer (so that the other designer's o¤er would not be inspected at all). The di¤erence in the nature of competition results in a remarkable di¤erence in the resulting equilibrium: designers in the current setting necessarily play a mixed strategy whenever inequality (1) does not hold; whereas senders in Au and Kawai (2017) can always play a pure strategy in equilibrium. Intuitively, if all designers adopt a common prize distribution with reservation value below U , it is pro…table for an individual designer to deviate to o¤er a box with a higher reservation value so that the agent would necessarily sample him before other designers. Also, our search setting allows us to investigate the e¤ect of search friction on designers'equilibrium behavior, which we address in the next section.
Comparative Statics
In this section, we study how the degree of competition a¤ects the equilibrium outcome. Specifically, we analyze how the equilibrium responds to changes in the agent's search environment, including the number of boxes N , her outside option u 0 , and her search cost c.
Our main comparative statics result is as follows.
Proposition 3 The designer's equilibrium payo¤ decreases if (i) the number of designers N increases;
(ii) the agent's outside option u 0 increases; or (iii) the agent's search cost c increases.
The increases above are strict whenever (1) does not hold.
Part (i) and (ii) of the proposition are quite intuitive. An increase in the number of designers lowers the chance that each individual designer is selected. An increase in the agent's outside option lowers the likelihood that each designer's realized prize can outperform the outside option.
More interestingly, part (iii) of Proposition 3 states that an increase in the agent's search cost would also harm the designers. The intuition is as follows. As the agent's search cost goes up, she
is less willing to sample many boxes. As a result, the designers must improve their o¤ers by raising the reservation values of their boxes. However, a high reservation value lowers the likelihood that a good prize realizes, thus hurting the designer's payo¤.
Our result that an increase in search cost intensify competition stands in interesting contrast to existing studies in consumer search. In the setting of Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) , consumers sequentially search for products that give them high match values, and …rms compete by choosing prices (rather than the match-value distribution). It is found that an increase in consumers'search cost raises the equilibrium price and thus the …rms'pro…t. Intuitively, a high search cost mitigates competition among …rms: knowing that the consumers are less willing to search for competing products in the market, each sampled …rm e¤ectively face a larger demand and can a¤ord to charge a higher price.
While both our model and the consumer-search model involve agent/consumer searching sequentially for an satisfactory prize/match value, the nature of competition in the two models are markedly di¤erent. In our model, the designers'choices of prize distributions direct the agent's search. Therefore, designers compete through prize distributions, which must be appealing enough (i.e., having a high reservation value) to stand a good chance of being sampled and inspected. On the other hand, consumers in Wolinsky's model conduct a random search, and the prices chosen by …rms do not a¤ect consumer's search behavior. As a result, a high search cost is bad news for designers in our setting as the agent is less inclined to search, and the designers must improve their o¤ers in reservation value. On the other hand, a high search cost is good news to …rms in Wolinsky's model, as they know that conditional on being sampled, the consumer is less likely to go for a competing product.
We conclude this section by specifying how the reservation-value distribution responds to changes considered in Proposition 3.
Corollary 3
If either N , u 0 , or c increases, the reservation-value distribution has a larger atom at the top, while its support
Corollary 3 is in accord with the intuition described above. When either the number of designers, the agent's outside option or search cost increases, the competition among the designers intensi…es, inducing them to o¤er more aggressive reservation values for their boxes. Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat (2012) …nd that when search cost decreases, a fraction of …rms respond by switching from board designs to niche designs. In contrast, Corollary 3 …nds that when search cost decreases, designers respond by lowering the probability of adopting risky distributions.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we consider a sequential-search setting in which a number of designers compete by choosing prize distributions. When competition is relatively mild, only mixed-strategy equilibria exist, suggesting that dispersion in product designs can naturally arise in equilibrium. We also show that a linear structure of the sampling probability function is necessary and su¢ cient for symmetric equilibria. This characterization result allows us to conduct comparative statics, and we …nd that the competition among designers is mitigated if search friction decreases.
There are a couple of promising directions for future research. First, our analysis assumes that the agent's outside option is so high that boxes with a degenerate distribution will not be sampled.
Future studies can consider the case where the agent has a lower outside option. While it is clear that the linear structure we identify remains a su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium, whether it is also necessary requires further investigation. Second, our model only considers competition over product designs, while abstracting away any form of price competition. A model in which …rms compete both in price and product design may explain price (and product design) dispersion without assuming heterogenous consumers or …rms.
the reservation value of F 0 exceeds that of F . Thus, the maximum reservation value is obtained by a distribution that assigns probability to prize 0 and probability 1 to prize 1, as there does not exist any strict mean-preserving spread of such a distribution. Likewise, the minimum reservation value is obtained by a distribution that assigns probability 1 to prize , as there does not exist any strict mean-preserving contraction of such a distribution.
Next, note that any reservation value in the interval c; 1 c can be attained by some 
Proof of Proposition 1:
Suppose it is a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium for each designer to adopt F . Suppose also that the reservation value of F is U < U . An individual designer's equilibrium payo¤ is the product of following two terms: (i) the probability of being drawn, and
(ii) the expected payo¤ conditional on being drawn. Given that all designers o¤er an identical distribution, the probability of being drawn is at most
which is strictly less than 1. Next, denote by (p) the designer's expected payo¤ conditional on being drawn and prize p realizing. His expected payo¤ conditional on being drawn is thus
Let " > 0 and F 0 be a mean-preserving spread of F such that
". By deviating to F 0 , the designer's box is drawn with probability 1 and the expected payo¤ conditional on being drawn decreases by no more than ". Therefore, for " su¢ ciently small, such a deviation is de…nitely pro…table. As a result, if a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists, its associated reservation value is necessarily the maximum possible, which equals U .
Next we identify conditions under which it is an equilibrium for all designers to choose a reservation value U i = U . The payo¤ of following the candidate equilibrium strategy is
The most pro…table deviation is to choose a distribution that maximizes the probability of being selected by the agent, conditional on being the last box opened. Note that the conditioning event occurs if and only if all other boxes have a realized prize of 0. Therefore, the deviation maximizes the probability that a prize no less than u 0 realizes, and the corresponding payo¤ is thus
The condition for such a strategy to constitute a symmetric equilibrium is thus inequality (2) . It is straightforward to verify that the left-hand side of the inequality is strictly convex in , equal to 0 if = 0, and negative if is su¢ ciently small. Therefore, the inequality holds if and only if ^ for some^ . The e¤ects of an increase in c, u 0 , and N are immediate.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We begin with a simple observation that the support of any equilibrium distribution of reservation values takes the form
Lemma 3
The support of any symmetric-equilibrium reservation-value distribution takes the form
Proof. Suppose I is a maximal open interval in
over which the equilibrium reservationvalue distribution assigns a zero measure. Then reservation value sup I necessarily gives a strictly lower pro…t than that of inf I, as they are both associated with the same probability of being sampled, but the latter is associated with a strictly higher probability of being selected conditional on being sampled. This is because there is a mean-preserving contraction of F sup I that allows the designer to receive a higher expected payo¤ conditional on being sampled than that of F sup I .
To see this, one can modify F sup I as follows. Let "; " 0 > 0 and take a small positive measure B fp : p < sup Ig such that F sup I (B) < " and a small positive measure A fp : p sup Ig such that F sup I (A) < " 0 . Now if " 0 is large relative to ", the two measures can be merged to form an atom at some U 0 > inf I. This strictly increases the probability of being selected conditional on the realization of B without a¤ecting that of A. This contradicts that both sup I and inf I are on the support of G.
The lemma below establishes that the designer's (ex-ante) payo¤ in every symmetric equilibrium is identical.
Lemma 4
The symmetric equilibrium payo¤ of a designer is unique.
Proof. Suppose inequality (2) does not hold so that there are only mixed-strategy equilibria.
Suppose there are two distinct equilibria G; fF U g U 2supp(G) and G 0 ; fF 0 U g U 2supp(G 0 ) with distinct payo¤s and 0 such that 0 > . Denote by ( ) and 0 ( ) the respective probabilities of being sampled in these equilibria. By Lemma 2, reservation value u 0 is on the supports of both equilibria.
As boxes with reservation value u 0 is sampled if and only if all other boxes have a prize realization
is optimal for a designer with reservation value u 0 to maximize the probability of realization of prizes above u 0 , which can be achieved by the prize distribution with binary support 0; , which implies that 0 (u 0 ) > (u 0 ), a contradiction.
Next, if inequality (2) holds, a pure-strategy equilibrium in which all designers choose prize distribution with support f0; 1g exists. In this equilibrium, the designers'payo¤ is =
Suppose there is another mixed-strategy equilibrium that gives a payo¤
Then the same argument as above implies that
. However, by inequality (2), (1 )
However, this is impossible as the probability that all N 1 boxes fail to deliver a prize above u 0 is maximized at (1 )
It follows from Reny (1999) that the game between the designers admit a symmetric equilibrium. Using Lemma 4, there is a unique symmetric-equilibrium payo¤, let's denote it by .
Let G; fF U g U 2supp(G) be a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. We show below that it must satis…es conditions (i) to (iv) in the proposition statement.
First, we show that G must have an atom at U of size , implicitly de…ned by
To see this, note that by choosing reservation value U (thus o¤ering prize distribution with support f0; 1g), a designer is competing e¤ectively only against other designers that adopt the same prize distribution. The corresponding payo¤ is thus 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
(1 ) .
In the payo¤ expression above, the …rst line in the bracket is the probability that the designer is the …rst one being sampled, and the second line is the probability that he is the second one being sampled, and the other terms can be similarly interpreted. Moreover, conditional on being sampled, he is selected with probability (the size of atom at prize 1). Straightforward algebra shows that we can simplify the expression above into
. This proves that all symmetric equilibrium must satisfy condition (i) in the proposition statement, with implicitly de…ned in equation (7) .
Recall that in a symmetric equilibrium G; fF U g U 2supp(G) , the probability (U ) of being sampled by o¤ering a box of reservation value U is given by equation (3). We explain below that this function necessarily takes the following form.
where is de…ned in equation (7), andÛ = sup supp (G) n U .
Suppose …rst that ( ) = ( ). De…ne an individual designer's payo¤ function (p; U )
of o¤ering prize p within a box of reservation U using equation (4) . Consider the designer's optimization problem (5) for some U 2 h u 0 ;Û i . We show below that the optimized value is exactly . The Lagrangian of the problem is
where is the Lagrange multiplier. As shown in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , given a , the problem of maximizing the Lagrangian can be solved by …nding the concave closure (in p) of the function (p; U ) + (max f0; p U g c).
If > c , then the Lagrangian is maximized by a binary prize distribution with support f0; 1g, contradicting that U < U . On the other hand, if < c , then the only distributions that maximize the Lagrangian assign a zero measure to prizes above U , but these distributions give reservation values strictly below U ; again a contradiction.
Therefore, it is necessary that = We show that it is necessary that (U ) =
. However, this is impossible as a designer o¤ering a reservation value U can always guarantee himself a payo¤ of c U conditional on being sampled, simply by o¤ering a prize distribution with binary support 0;
. This is, however, impossible as shown in the last paragraph.
We show below thatÛ is necessarily equal to c (1 ) N 1 . We have shown above that conditional on o¤ering a box with reservation value U 2
is one that has a binary support 0;
, yielding a conditional payo¤ of c U
. As a box with reservation valueÛ has a probability (1 ) N 1 of being sampled, the expected payo¤ of such a box is therefore (1 )
We have thus shown that every symmetric equilibrium must satisfy condition (ii) and (iv) in the proposition statement, with de…ned in equation (7), andÛ = c (1 ) N 1 . As the equilibrium sampling probability is ( ), and thus the payo¤ function is (p; U ), we know that any optimal prize distribution for U 2 h u 0 ;Û i must assign a zero measure to prizes (0; u 0 ), thus proving condition (iii) is necessary in equilibrium.
It remains to show that a strategy G; fF U g U 2supp(G) that satis…es conditions (i) to (iv) is an equilibrium. To this end, it su¢ ces to note that if all other designers adopt strategy G; fF U g U 2supp(G) that satis…es conditions (i) to (iv), it is optimal for a designer to follow as well.
Consider …rst the choice of reservation values. Consider problem (5) with (p; U ) = (p; U ), and U 0 2 Û ; U . It has a Lagrangian given by (9) . As U 0 >Û , it is necessary that the Lagrange multiplier equals .
It is thus clear that any prize distribution that delivers a reservation value U and assigns a zero measure to (0; u 0 ) would achieve an expected payo¤ of . Similarly, as satis…es equation (7), o¤ering reservation value U would also bring an expected payo¤ of . Therefore, G; fF U g U 2supp(G) is a best response to other designers playing G; fF U g U 2supp(G) . Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: By Proposition 2, it su¢ ces to show that there exists a reservationvalue distribution G such that when coupled with the set of prize distributions described in the proposition statement, equation (6) holds. Using equation (3), this means that we need a function G such that for U 2
Di¤erentiating both sides of the equation above with respect to p and rearranging, we get dG(U ) dU 
()
It can be shown that the left-hand side of equation (11) above is increasing and continuous in , 2 equals 0 when = 0, and equals N 
N , and equation (11) admits no solution.
Proof of Proposition 3: Using equation (7), equation (11) can be re-written as
It is immediate that the left-hand side of equation (12) is decreasing in , and is increasing in N . Consequently, the solution of equation in is decreasing in u 0 , c, and N . Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3:
Recall the left-hand side of equation (11) is increasing in . An increase in c therefore increases the solution of equation (11) in .
Next, recall from the proof of Proposition 2 thatÛ = c (1 ) N 1 . Together with equation (7), we haveÛ = N ( c)
N 1
()
N . As sgn
negative, an increase in c necessarily lowersÛ . Q.E.D.
